Real realism: The galilean strategy

Philosophical Review 110 (2):151-197 (2001)
Abstract
This essay aims to disentangle various types of anti-realism, and to disarm the considerations that are deployed to support them. I distinguish empiricist versions of anti-realism from constructivist versions, and, within each of these, semantic arguments from epistemological arguments. The centerpiece of my defense of a modest version of realism - real realism - is the thought that there are resources within our ordinary ways of talking about and knowing about everyday objects that enable us to extend our claims to unobservable entities. This strategy, the Galilean strategy, is explained using the historical example of the telescope.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1215/00318108-110-2-151
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 22,037
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Howard Sankey (2014). On Relativism and Pluralism: Response to Steven Bland. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47:98-103.
Matthias Egg (2012). Causal Warrant for Realism About Particle Physics. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 43 (2):259-280.

View all 21 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

183 ( #20,323 of 1,934,423 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

22 ( #29,107 of 1,934,423 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.