The argument from illusion: Objects and objections

Mind 81 (April):191-207 (1972)
The paper's first four sections give a taxonomy and criticism of three classes of objections to the argument from illusion. the last section raises the question whether its main premise does not misclassify perceptual accusatives (e.g. 'sensation of bentness') as individuatives that imply the existence of, say, bent particulars
Keywords Epistemology  Illusion  Intention  Perception  Sense Data
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/mind/LXXXI.322.191
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,974
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Manolo Martínez (2011). Imperative Content and the Painfulness of Pain. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):67-90.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

46 ( #73,108 of 1,725,840 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #268,271 of 1,725,840 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.