The argument from illusion: Objects and objections

Mind 81 (April):191-207 (1972)
Abstract
The paper's first four sections give a taxonomy and criticism of three classes of objections to the argument from illusion. the last section raises the question whether its main premise does not misclassify perceptual accusatives (e.g. 'sensation of bentness') as individuatives that imply the existence of, say, bent particulars
Keywords Epistemology  Illusion  Intention  Perception  Sense Data
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Manolo Martínez (2011). Imperative Content and the Painfulness of Pain. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):67-90.
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