Mind 81 (April):191-207 (1972)
|Abstract||The paper's first four sections give a taxonomy and criticism of three classes of objections to the argument from illusion. the last section raises the question whether its main premise does not misclassify perceptual accusatives (e.g. 'sensation of bentness') as individuatives that imply the existence of, say, bent particulars|
|Keywords||Epistemology Illusion Intention Perception Sense Data|
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