David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 58 (2):153 - 202 (1984)
A number of philosophers, linguists and psychologists have made the dual claim that metaphor is cognitively significant and that metaphorical utterances have a meaning not reducible to literal paraphrase. Such a position requires support from an account of metaphorical meaning that can render metaphors cognitively meaningful without the reduction to literal statement. It therefore requires a theory of meaning that can integrate metaphor within its sematics, yet specify why it is not reducible to literal paraphrase. I introduce the idea of a "second-order meaning", of which metaphor is but one instance, that is a function on literal-conventional, i.e., first-order meaning, and outline a linguistic framework designed to provide a representation of linguistic meaning for both. This framework is designed to represent linguistic units ranging from a single word to an entire text since I argue that the by-now familiar position that the sentence is the appropriate unit for metaphor has mislead us into asking the wrong questions about metaphorical meaning. With this apparatus, we can specify the conditions under which an utterance may transcend the constraints on first-order meaning (transgressions not always apparent on the sentential level), without thereby being "meaningless". Conversely, we can specify the conditions that may render apparently odd utterances first-order meaningful rather than metaphorical. In this way we see how metaphorical language differs both from deviant language and from specialized language such as technical language, fanciful and fantastical language (in fairy tales, science fiction, etc.).
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
George Lakoff (1980/2003). Metaphors We Live By. University of Chicago Press.
Nelson Goodman (1968). Languages of Art. Bobbs-Merrill.
Donald Davidson (2010). What Metaphors Mean. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Critical Inquiry. Routledge 31.
John Searle (1985). Expression and Meaning. Cambridge University Press.
H. P. Grice (1969). Utterer's Meaning and Intention. Philosophical Review 78 (2):147-177.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Jakub Mácha (2011). Metaphor in the Twilight Area Between Philosophy and Linguistics. In P. Stalmaszczyk & K. Kosecki (eds.), Turning Points in the Philosophy of Language and Linguistics. Peter Lang 159--169.
Mark A. Matienzo, On the Very Importance of the Metaphoric as Semantic to Communication, Understanding, and the Philosophy of Language.
Ben Vedder (2002). On the Meaning of Metaphor in Gadamer's Hermeneutics. Research in Phenomenology 32 (1):196-209.
Alexander J. Doherty (2002). Aquinas on Scriptural Metaphor and Allegory. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 76:183-192.
Catherine Wearing (2006). Metaphor and What is Said. Mind and Language 21 (3):310–332.
Aaron Wilson (2011). Peirce Versus Davidson on Metaphorical Meaning. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47 (2):117-135.
Josef Stern (2006). Metaphor, Literal, Literalism. Mind and Language 21 (3):243–279.
Ernest Lepore & Matthew Stone (2010). Against Metaphorical Meaning. Topoi 29 (2):165-180.
Nick Zangwill (2009). Appropriate Musical Metaphors. Nordic Journal of Aesthetics 20 (38).
Lynne Tirrell (1991). Reductive and Nonreductive Simile Theories of Metaphor. Journal of Philosophy 88 (7):337-358.
Added to index2011-05-29
Total downloads19 ( #166,201 of 1,780,595 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #291,765 of 1,780,595 )
How can I increase my downloads?