David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):127-139 (2007)
Scepticism about the possibility of machine consciousness comes in at least two forms. Some argue that our neurobiology is special, and only something sharing our neurobiology could be a subject of experience. Others argue that a machine couldn't be anything else but a zombie: there could never be something it is like to be a machine. I advance a dynamic sensorimotor account of consciousness which argues against both these varieties of scepticism
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Mirko Farina (2013). Neither Touch nor Vision: Sensory Substitution as Artificial Synaesthesia? Biology and Philosophy 28 (4):639-655.
Stephen E. Robbins (2009). The Cost of Explicit Memory. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):33-66.
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