Making Sense of Phenomenal Unity: An Intentionalist Account of Temporal Experience

Abstract
Our perceptual experiences stretch across time to present us with movement, persistence and change. How is this possible given that perceptual experiences take place in the present that has no duration? In this paper I argue that this problem is one and the same as the problem of accounting for how our experiences occurring at different times can be phenomenally unified over time so that events occurring at different times can be experienced together. Any adequate account of temporal experience must also account for phenomenal unity. I look to Edmund Husserl's writings on time consciousness for such an account
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    Rudolf Carnap (1967). The Logical Structure of the World. Berkeley, University of California Press.

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