Embraining Culture: Leaky Minds and Spongy Brains
Teorema - Special Issue Dedicated to the Extended Mind (2011)
| Abstract | We offer an argument for the extended mind based on considerations from brain development. We argue that our brains develop to function in partnership with cognitive resources located in our external environments. Through our cultural upbringing we are trained to use artefacts in problem solving that become factored into the cognitive routines our brains support. Our brains literally grow to work in close partnership with resources we regularly and reliably interact with. We take this argument to be in line with complementarity or “second-wave” defences of the extended mind that stress the functional differences between biological elements and external, environmental resources in putative cases of extended cognition. Complementarity defences argue that many of the kinds of cognition humans excel at can only be accomplished by brains working together with a body that directly manipulates and acts on the world [Rowlands (1999); Menary (2007); Sutton (2010)]. We argue that complementarity and functionalist defences of the extended mind aren’t opposed, but that complementarity considerations can provide much needed and hitherto under exploited leverage in defending EMT. Moreover, the developmental work we will describe adds extra weight to the complementarity case for EMT. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Extended Mind Complementarity Extended Functionalism Neural Development Plasticity Synaptic Pruning | |||||||||
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Zoe Drayson (2010). Extended Cognition and the Metaphysics of Mind. Cognitive Systems Research 11 (4):367-377.
Shannon Spaulding (2012). Overextended Cognition. Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):469 - 490.
Michael David Kirchhoff (2012). Extended Cognition and Fixed Properties: Steps to a Third-Wave Version of Extended Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):287-308.
Jennifer Greenwood (forthcoming). Contingent Transcranialism and Deep Functional Cognitive Integration: The Case of Human Emotional Ontogenesis. Philosophical Psychology:1-17.
John Sutton, Celia B. Harris, Paul G. Keil & Amanda J. Barnier (2010). The Psychology of Memory, Extended Cognition, and Socially Distributed Remembering. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):521-560.
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Katalin Farkas (2012). Two Versions of the Extended Mind Thesis. Philosophia 40 (3):435-447.
Stephen Hetherington (2012). The Extended Knower. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):207 - 218.
Georg Theiner (2008). From Extended Minds to Group Minds: Rethinking the Boundaries of the Mental. Dissertation, Indiana University
Danuta Sobczyńska (1996). Idea komplementarności ekspertymentów. Filozofia Nauki 2.
Kim Sterelny (2010). Minds: Extended or Scaffolded? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):465-481.
Michael Kirchhoff (forthcoming). Extended Cognition & Constitution: Re-Evaluating the Constitutive Claim of Extended Cognition. Philosophical Psychology:1-26.
Fred Adams (2012). Extended Cognition Meets Epistemology. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):107 - 119.
Robert D. Rupert (2010). Representation in Extended Cognitive Systems : Does the Scaffolding of Language Extend the Mind? In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Mit Press.
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