Is rationality really “bounded” by information processing constraints?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):683-684 (2000)
| Abstract | Extremist views on normative rationality fail to address differences in responding owing to intellectual ability or epistemic self-regulation. Individual difference research thus raises serious questions concerning the scientific utility of universal rationality and universal irrationality theories. However, recent data indicate that computational capacity theories do not account adequately for within-subject variability in normative responding, memory-reasoning independence, and instances of ability-normative reasoning independence. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,705 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesJonathan Way (2009). Two Accounts of the Normativity of Rationality. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
X. T. Wang (2000). Beyond “Pardonable Errors by Subjects and Unpardonable Ones by Psychologists”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):699-700.
Thomas Kelly (2003). Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
Thomas Sturm (2012). The “Rationality Wars” in Psychology: Where They Are and Where They Could Go. Inquiry 55 (1):66-81.
Robert van Gulick (1980). Rationality and the Anomalous Nature of the Mental. Philosophy Research Archives 7:1404.
Robert C. Cummins, Pierre Poirier & Martin Roth (2004). Epistemological Strata and the Rules of Right Reason. Synthese 141 (3):287 - 331.
Raanan Lipshitz (2000). Two Cheers for Bounded Rationality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):756-757.
Pierre Poirier (2004). Epistemological Strata and the Rules of Right Reason. Synthese 141 (3):287 - 331.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads5 ( #160,483 of 549,131 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,397 of 549,131 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
