Two notions of epistemic normativity

Theoria 75 (3):161-178 (2009)
Abstract
The overwhelmingly dominant view of epistemic normativity has been an extreme form of deontology. I argue that although the pull towards deontology is quite understandable, given the traditional concerns of epistemology, there is no good reason for not also adopting a complementary consequentialist notion of epistemic normativity, which can be put to use in applied epistemology. I further argue that this consequentialist notion is not, despite appearances and popular sentiment to the contrary, any less genuinely epistemic than the deontological notion and that it may even be considered more genuinely normative.
Keywords deontology vs. consequentialism about justification  epistemic normativity  epistemology
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References found in this work BETA
Roderick M. Chisholm (1991). Firth and the Ethics of Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):119-128.

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