David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 166 (2):375-395 (2009)
The aim of this paper is to examine the kind of evidence that might be adduced in support of relativist semantics of a kind that have recently been proposed for predicates of personal taste, for epistemic modals, for knowledge attributions and for other cases. I shall concentrate on the case of taste predicates, but what I have to say is easily transposed to the other cases just mentioned. I shall begin by considering in general the question of what kind of evidence can be offered in favour of some semantic theory or framework of semantic theorizing. In other words, I shall begin with the difficult question of the empirical significance of semantic theorizing. In Sect. 2, I outline a relativist semantic theory, and in Sect. 3, I review four types of evidence that might be offered in favour of a relativistic framework. I show that the evidence is not conclusive because a sophisticated form of contextualism can stand up to the evidence. However, the evidence can be taken to support the view that either relativism or the sophisticated form of contextualism is correct
|Keywords||Relativism Contextualism Indexicality Context of use Circumstance of evaluation Taste predicates Knowledge attributions Epistemic modals Future contingents David Lewis David Kaplan|
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References found in this work BETA
Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) (1989). Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press, Usa.
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John MacFarlane (2009). Nonindexical Contextualism. Synthese 166 (2):231--250.
Peter Lasersohn (2005). Context Dependence, Disagreement, and Predicates of Personal Taste. Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (6):643--686.
Citations of this work BETA
Michele Palmira (2015). The Semantic Significance of Faultless Disagreement. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):349-371.
Ragnar Francén (2010). No Deep Disagreement for New Relativists. Philosophical Studies 151 (1):19--37.
John Eriksson & Marco Tiozzo (2016). Matters of Ambiguity: Faultless Disagreement, Relativism and Realism. Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1517-1536.
Pendaran Roberts & Kelly Ann Schmidtke (forthcoming). Relationalism About Perceptible Properties and the Principle of Charity. Synthese:1-25.
Max Kölbel (2015). Relativism 2: Semantic Content. Philosophy Compass 10 (1):52–67.
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