David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):242-257 (2008)
Semantic theories for natural languages purport to describe a central aspect of the meaning of natural language sentences. In doing so, they usually employ some notion of truth. Most semanticists, even those who have no objections to invoking propositions, will define a truth-predicate that applies to sentences. Some will also employ a notion of propositional truth. Both types of semanticist face the question whether and how the semantic notion(s) of truth they are employing is (are)related to the ordinary, pre-theoretic notion(s) of truth. It seems immediately problematic to say that the semantic truth notion is a pre-theoretic notion. For pretheoretically, we do not seem to apply “true” to sentences. So, if the semantic truth notion is in any interesting way related to a pre-theoretic notion of truth, then the relationship is more complex. As I shall explain in Section 2, however, there are some straightforward ways of postulating an analytic link between semantic truth notions and ordinary truth.
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Citations of this work BETA
Max Kölbel (2015). Relativism 2: Semantic Content. Philosophy Compass 10 (1):52–67.
Max Kölbel (2015). Relativism 1: Representational Content. Philosophy Compass 10 (1):38-51.
Karl Schafer (2012). Assessor Relativism and the Problem of Moral Disagreement. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):602-620.
Max Kölbel (2008). "True" as Ambiguous. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):359-384.
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