Truth in semantics

Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):242-257 (2008)
Semantic theories for natural languages purport to describe a central aspect of the meaning of natural language sentences. In doing so, they usually employ some notion of truth. Most semanticists, even those who have no objections to invoking propositions, will define a truth-predicate that applies to sentences. Some will also employ a notion of propositional truth. Both types of semanticist face the question whether and how the semantic notion(s) of truth they are employing is (are)related to the ordinary, pre-theoretic notion(s) of truth. It seems immediately problematic to say that the semantic truth notion is a pre-theoretic notion. For pretheoretically, we do not seem to apply “true” to sentences. So, if the semantic truth notion is in any interesting way related to a pre-theoretic notion of truth, then the relationship is more complex. As I shall explain in Section 2, however, there are some straightforward ways of postulating an analytic link between semantic truth notions and ordinary truth.
Keywords Truth  Semantics
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1475-4975.2008.00174.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Max Kölbel (2015). Relativism 2: Semantic Content. Philosophy Compass 10 (1):52–67.
Max Kölbel (2008). "True" as Ambiguous. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):359-384.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

44 ( #77,024 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #99,332 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.