David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Nicholas Griffin & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Russell Vs. Meinong: The Legacy of. Routledge (2009)
It would be an understatement to say that Russell was interested in Cantorian diagonal paradoxes. His discovery of the various versions of Russell’s paradox—the classes version, the predicates version, the propositional functions version—had a lasting effect on his views in philosophical logic. Similar Cantorian paradoxes regarding propositions—such as that discussed in §500 of The Principles of Mathematics—were surely among the reasons Russell eventually abandoned his ontology of propositions.1 However, Russell’s reasons for abandoning what he called “denoting concepts”, and his rejection of similar “semantic dualisms” such as Frege’s theory of sense and reference—at least in “On Denoting”—made no explicit mention of any Cantorian paradox. My aim in this paper is to argue that such paradoxes do pose a problem for certain theories such as Frege’s, and early Russell’s, about how definite descriptions are meaningful. My first aim is simply to lay out the problem I have in mind. Next, I shall turn to arguing that the theories of descriptions endorsed by Frege and by Russell prior to “On Denoting” are susceptible to the problem. Finally, I explore what responses a..
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Alex Oliver & Timothy Smiley (2005). Plural Descriptions and Many-Valued Functions. Mind 114 (456):1039-1068.
Kevin C. Klement (2004). Putting Form Before Function: Logical Grammar in Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. Philosophers' Imprint 4 (2):1-47.
Andrew P. Rebera (2009). The Gray's Elegy Argument: Denoting Concepts, Singular Terms, and Truth-Value Dependence. Prolegomena 8 (2):207-232.
Gideon Makin (2000). The Metaphysicians of Meaning: Russell and Frege on Sense and Denotation. Routledge.
B. Brogaard (2006). The 'Gray's Elegy' Argument, and the Prospects for the Theory of Denoting Concepts. Synthese 152 (1):47 - 79.
Kevin C. Klement (2001). Russell's Paradox in Appendix B of the Principles of Mathematics : Was Frege's Response Adequate? History and Philosophy of Logic 22 (1):13-28.
Howard Wettstein (1990). Frege‐Russell Semantics? Dialectica 44 (1‐2):113-135.
Francis Jeffry Pelletier & Bernard Linsky (2009). Russell Vs. Frege on Definite Descriptions as Singular Terms. In Nicholas Griffin & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Russell Vs. Meinong: The Legacy of "on Denoting". Routledge
Kevin C. Klement (2005). Does Frege Have Too Many Thoughts? A Cantorian Problem Revisited. Analysis 65 (1):44-49.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads48 ( #94,282 of 1,939,032 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #124,527 of 1,939,032 )
How can I increase my downloads?