David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Analysis 65 (1):44-49 (2005)
This paper continues a thread in Analysis begun by Adam Rieger and Nicholas Denyer. Rieger argued that Frege’s theory of thoughts violates Cantor’s theorem by postulating as many thoughts as concepts. Denyer countered that Rieger’s construction could not show that the thoughts generated are always distinct for distinct concepts. By focusing on universally quantified thoughts, rather than thoughts that attribute a concept to an individual, I give a different construction that avoids Denyer’s problem. I also note that this problem for Frege’s philosophy was discovered by Bertrand Russell as early as 1902 and has been discussed intermittently since.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Kevin C. Klement (2010). Russell, His Paradoxes, and Cantor's Theorem: Part I. Philosophy Compass 5 (1):16-28.
Similar books and articles
Pieranna Garavaso (1991). Frege and the Analysis of Thoughts. History and Philosophy of Logic 12 (2):195-210.
Nicholas Denyer (2003). Rieger's Problem with Frege's Ontology. Analysis 63 (2):166–170.
Kevin C. Klement (2009). A Cantorian Argument Against Frege's and Early Russell's Theories of Descriptions. In Nicholas Griffin & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Russell Vs. Meinong: The Legacy of. Routledge
Mark Textor (2009). A Repair of Frege's Theory of Thoughts. Synthese 167 (1):105 - 123.
Erich H. Reck (2005). Frege on Numbers: Beyond the Platonist Picture. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 13 (2):25-40.
Richard Heck & Robert May (2011). The Composition of Thoughts. Noûs 45 (1):126-166.
Marian Zouhar (2011). The Structure of Frege's Thoughts. History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (3):199-209.
Dirk Greimann (2008). Does Frege Use a Truth-Predicate in His ‘Justification’ of the Laws of Logic? A Comment on Weiner. Mind 117 (466):403-425.
Kevin C. Klement (2005). Does Frege Have Too Many Thoughts? A Cantorian Problem Revisited. Analysis 65 (285):45–49.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads95 ( #49,058 of 1,904,899 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #102,118 of 1,904,899 )
How can I increase my downloads?