Human knowledge and the infinite progress of reasoning

Philosophical Studies 134 (1):1 - 17 (2007)
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to explain how infinitism—the view that reasons are endless and non-repeating—solves the epistemic regress problem and to defend that solution against some objections. The first step is to explain what the epistemic regress problem is and, equally important, what it is not. Second, I will discuss the foundationalist and coherentist responses to the regress problem and offer some reasons for thinking that neither response can solve the problem, no matter how they are tweaked. Then, I want to present the infinitist solution to the problem and defend it against some of the well known objections to it.
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References found in this work BETA
P. Klein (2002). Skepticism. In P. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Peter Klein (2003). When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):718–729.

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Citations of this work BETA
John Turri (2013). Infinitism, Finitude and Normativity. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):791-795.

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