David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 134 (1):1 - 17 (2007)
The purpose of this paper is to explain how infinitism—the view that reasons are endless and non-repeating—solves the epistemic regress problem and to defend that solution against some objections. The first step is to explain what the epistemic regress problem is and, equally important, what it is not. Second, I will discuss the foundationalist and coherentist responses to the regress problem and offer some reasons for thinking that neither response can solve the problem, no matter how they are tweaked. Then, I want to present the infinitist solution to the problem and defend it against some of the well known objections to it.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy of Religion Philosophy of Mind Epistemology Logic Philosophy|
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References found in this work BETA
Keith Lehrer (2000). Theory of Knowledge. Westview Press.
Ernest Sosa (1991). Knowledge in Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Peter D. Klein (1999). Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):297-325.
Robert Audi (1993). The Structure of Justification. Cambridge University Press.
Ernest Sosa (1997). Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles. Journal of Philosophy 94 (8):410-430.
Citations of this work BETA
Coos Engelsma (2015). Arbitrary Foundations? On Klein’s Objection to Foundationalism. Acta Analytica 30 (4):389-408.
Jonathan Ichikawa (2011). Quantifiers and Epistemic Contextualism. Philosophical Studies 155 (3):383-398.
Ian Schnee (forthcoming). Basic Factive Perceptual Reasons. Philosophical Studies:1-16.
Matteo Morganti (2014). Metaphysical Infinitism and the Regress of Being. Metaphilosophy 45 (2):232-244.
Adam C. Podlaskowski & Joshua A. Smith (2011). Infinitism and Epistemic Normativity. Synthese 178 (3):515-527.
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Jose L. Zalabardo (2008). Internalist Foundationalism and the Problem of the Epistemic Regress. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):34 - 58.
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