David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 55 (2):143 - 164 (1983)
Philosophers have sought to characterize a type of knowledge — what I call real knowledge — which is significantly different from the ordinary concept of knowledge. The concept of knowledge as true, justified belief — what I call knowledge simpliciter — failed to depict the sought after real knowledge because the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of knowledge simpliciter can be felicitously but accidentally fulfilled. Real knowledge is knowledge simpliciter plus a set of requirements which guarantee that the truth, belief and justification conditions are not accidentally conjoined. Two of those requirements have received considerable attention in recent literature by the defeasibility theorists and the causal theorists. I argue that a third requirement is needed to block the merely coincidental cosatisfaction of the belief and justification conditions and to capture our intuitions about the epistemic agent who possesses real knowledge. That condition ascribes a disposition to the real knower to believe all and only justified propositions in virtue of his/her belief that the propositions are justified. Two consequences of that requirement are discussed: (1) if S really knows that p, then S knows simpliciter that S knows simpliciter that p and (2) the iterative feature of real knowledge mentioned in (1) provides a basis for the rejection of a particularly pernicious form of scepticism.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Peter Klein (2007). Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):1 - 17.
Jane Duran (1988). Reliabilism, Foundationalism, and Naturalized Epistemic Justification Theory. Metaphilosophy 19 (2):113–127.
Similar books and articles
Elijah Chudnoff (2011). What Should a Theory of Knowledge Do? Dialectica 65 (4):561-579.
Matthias Steup, Epistemology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
David Smith (2007). Networking Real-World Knowledge. AI and Society 21 (4):421-428.
William P. Alston (1983). What's Wrong with Immediate Knowledge? Synthese 55 (April):73-96.
Richard Foley, A Trial Separation Between the Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Justified Belief.
S. O. Welding (2004). Die Differenz Von Meinung Und Wissen. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 35 (1):147-155.
Ram Neta (2009). D Efeating the Dogma of Defeasibility. In Patrick Greenough, Duncan Pritchard & Timothy Williamson (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press 161--82.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads56 ( #76,415 of 1,907,073 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #91,992 of 1,907,073 )
How can I increase my downloads?