Some things about stuff

Philosophical Studies 135 (3):407 - 423 (2007)
I examine the implications of positing stuff (which occupies an ontological category distinct from things) as a way to avoid colocation in the case of the statue and the bronze that constitutes it. When characterising stuff, it’s intuitive to say we often individuate stuff kinds by appealing to things and their relations (e.g., water is water rather than gold because it is entirely divisible into subportions which constitute or partially constitute H2O molecules). I argue that if this intuition is correct, there are important restrictions on how we can characterise stuff in order to avoid colocated portions of stuff.
Keywords stuff  constitution  coincidence  colocation
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DOI 10.2307/40208917
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References found in this work BETA
Josh Parsons (2007). 7. Theories of Location. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 3:201.

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Citations of this work BETA
Kris McDaniel (2010). A Return to the Analogy of Being. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):688 - 717.
Thomas J. McKay (2015). Stuff and Coincidence. Philosophical Studies 172 (11):3081-3100.
Kris Mcdaniel (2010). A Return to the Analogy of Being. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):688-717.

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