David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 135 (3):407 - 423 (2007)
I examine the implications of positing stuff (which occupies an ontological category distinct from things) as a way to avoid colocation in the case of the statue and the bronze that constitutes it. When characterising stuff, it’s intuitive to say we often individuate stuff kinds by appealing to things and their relations (e.g., water is water rather than gold because it is entirely divisible into subportions which constitute or partially constitute H2O molecules). I argue that if this intuition is correct, there are important restrictions on how we can characterise stuff in order to avoid colocated portions of stuff.
|Keywords||stuff constitution coincidence colocation|
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References found in this work BETA
Michael B. Burke (1997). Coinciding Objects: Reply to Lowe and Denkel. Analysis 57 (1):11–18.
Michael B. Burke (1994). Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of the Relations Among Objects, Sorts, Sortals, and Persistence Conditions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):591-624.
Ned Markosian (2004). Simples, Stuff, and Simple People. The Monist 87 (3):405-428.
Josh Parsons (2007). 7. Theories of Location. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 3:201.
Michael C. Rea (1995). The Problem of Material Constitution. Philosophical Review 104 (4):525-552.
Citations of this work BETA
Kris McDaniel (2010). A Return to the Analogy of Being. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):688 - 717.
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