When Is Genetic Reasoning Not Fallacious?

Argumentation 16 (4):383-400 (2002)
Attempts to evaluate a belief or argument on the basis of its cause or origin are usually condemned as committing the genetic fallacy. However, I sketch a number of cases in which causal or historical factors are logically relevant to evaluating a belief, including an interesting abductive form that reasons from the best explanation for the existence of a belief to its likely truth. Such arguments are also susceptible to refutation by genetic reasoning that may come very close to the standard examples given of supposedly fallacious genetic reasoning
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/A:1021132731699
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,658
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Jonathan Jong & Aku Visala (2014). Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Against Theism, Reconsidered. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76 (3):243-258.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

63 ( #54,147 of 1,725,999 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #118,705 of 1,725,999 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.