David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind 124 (494):493-516 (2015)
Pain asymbolics feel pain, but act as if they are indifferent to it. Nikola Grahek argues that such patients present a clear counterexample to motivationalism about pain. I argue that Grahek has mischaracterized pain asymbolia. Properly understood, asymbolics have lost a general capacity to care about their bodily integrity. Asymbolics’ indifference to pain thus does not show something about the intrinsic nature of pain ; it shows something about the relationship between pains and subjects, and how that relationship might break down. I explore the consequences of such a view for both motivationalism and the categorization of pain asymbolia as a syndrome, arguing for a close link between asymbolia and various forms of depersonalization.
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Citations of this work BETA
David Bain (2013). Pains That Don't Hurt. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):1-16.
Colin Klein (forthcoming). Pain, Care, and the Body: A Response to de Vignemont. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-6.
Voin Milevski (forthcoming). Weakness of Will and Motivational Internalism. Philosophical Psychology:1-10.
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