Conceptual closure in Anselm's proof: reply to Tony Roark

History and Philosophy of Logic 24 (2):131-134 (2003)
Let me begin my reply to Professor Roark’s objections in good old scholastic fashion, by a distinction. Philosophical objections can be good in two senses. In the first, trivial sense, a good objection is one that convincingly shows the presence of a genuine error in a position or reasoning. Such objections are useful, but uninspiring. In the second, non-trivial sense, a good philosophical objection broadens and deepens our understanding of the problems at issue, whether or not they manage to refute the opponent’s position. In this reply I am going to argue that even if Roark’s objections may not be necessarily good in the first, trivial sense, they are..
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DOI 10.1080/0144534031000106602
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Tony Roark (2003). Conceptual Closure in Anselm's Proof. History and Philosophy of Logic 24 (1):1-14.

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