Perspective-neutral intrinsic value

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):323-337 (2011)
Is it possible to do a good thing, or to make the world a better place? Some argue that it is not possible, because perspective-neutral value does not exist. Some argue that ‘good’ does not play the right grammatical role; or that all good things are good ‘in a way’; or that goodness is inherently perspective-dependent. I argue that the logical and semantic properties of ‘good’ are what we should expect of an evaluative predicate; that the many ways of being good don't threaten the thesis that some ways are perspective-independent; and that there are clear examples of perspective-independent goodness.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01399.x
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