Graduate studies at Western
Foundations of Science 9 (1):65-101 (2004)
|Abstract||Causal inference in the empiricalsciences is based on counterfactuals. The mostcommon approach utilizes a statistical model ofpotential outcomes to estimate causal effectsof treatments. On the other hand, one leadingapproach to the study of causation inphilosophical logic has been the analysis ofcausation in terms of counterfactualconditionals. This paper discusses and connectsboth approaches to counterfactual causationfrom philosophy and statistics. Specifically, Ipresent the counterfactual account of causationin terms of Lewis's possible-world semantics,and reformulate the statistical potentialoutcome framework using counterfactualconditionals. This procedure highlights variousproperties and mechanisms of the statisticalmodel.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Robert Northcott (2009). On Lewis, Schaffer and the Non-Reductive Evaluation of Counterfactuals. Theoria 75 (4):336-343.
Ernest Sosa (ed.) (1975). Causation and Conditionals. Oxford University Press.
Morteza Dehghani, Rumen Iliev & Stefan Kaufmann (2012). Causal Explanation and Fact Mutability in Counterfactual Reasoning. Mind and Language 27 (1):55-85.
Stathis Psillos (2004). A Glimpse of the Secret Connexion: Harmonizing Mechanisms with Counterfactuals. Perspectives on Science 12 (3):288-319.
James Woodward (2004). Counterfactuals and Causal Explanation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):41 – 72.
David Galles & Judea Pearl (1998). An Axiomatic Characterization of Causal Counterfactuals. Foundations of Science 3 (1):151-182.
S. Barker (2003). A Dilemma for the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):62 – 77.
Peter Menzies, Counterfactual Theories of Causation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Jiji Zhang (2013). A Lewisian Logic of Causal Counterfactuals. Minds and Machines 23 (1):77-93.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads10 ( #114,476 of 739,985 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,680 of 739,985 )
How can I increase my downloads?