De-moralizing disgustingness

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):253–278 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Understanding disgustingness is philosophically important partly because claims about disgustingness play a prominent role in moral discourse and practice. It is also important because disgustingness has been used to illustrate the promise of "neo-sentimentalism." Recently developed by moral philosophers such as David Wiggins, John McDowell, Simon Blackburn, Justin D'Arms and Dan Jacobson, neo-sentimentalism holds that for a thing to be disgusting is for it to be "appropriate" to respond to it with disgust. In this paper, I argue that from what we currently know about the disgust response, these accounts are mistaken. Instead, disgustingness is best understood as a descriptive property: fundamentally, things that are disgusting-for-S are things that possess triggers for S's disgust mechanism. Theoretically, my account puts pressure on neo-sentimentalists to show that the responses they appeal to can anchor normative properties. Practically, my account shows that we must abandon authoritative claims that certain things really are--or are not--disgusting

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Disgust: The body and soul emotion in the 21st century.P. Rozin, J. Haidt & C. R. McCauley - 2009 - In B. O. Olatunji & D. McKay (eds.), Disgust and its disorders. American Psychological Association. pp. 2008.
The Good and the Gross.Alexandra Plakias - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):261-278.
Metaethics and emotions research: A response to Prinz.Karen Jones - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):45-53.
Neo-sentimentalism and disgust.Joshua Gert - 2005 - Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (3):345-352.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
58 (#246,851)

6 months
5 (#244,526)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Christopher Morgan-Knapp
State University of New York at Binghamton

Citations of this work

The Good and the Gross.Alexandra Plakias - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):261-278.
You Disgust Me. Or Do You? On the Very Idea of Moral Disgust.Iskra Fileva - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):19-33.
Disgust Talked About.Nina Strohminger - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (7):478-493.
Butchering Benevolence Moral Progress beyond the Expanding Circle.Hanno Sauer - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (1):153-167.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references