David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Law and Philosophy 28 (4):327 - 365 (2009)
This articles proposes that theories and principles of distributive justice be considered substantively egalitarian iff they satisfy each of three conditions: (1) they consider the bare fact that a person is in certain circumstances to be a conclusive reason for placing another relevantly identically entitled person in the same circumstances, except where this conflicts with other similarly conclusive reasons arising from the circumstances of other persons; (2) they can be stated as 'equality of x for all persons', making no explicit or implicit exclusion of persons or individuals and showing no greater concern and respect for some rather than others; and (3) they pursue equality in a dimension that is valuable to egalitarians. On this construal, prioritarianism and Dworkinian equality of resources, a view often identified as luck egalitarian, are not substantively egalitarian, but equality of opportunity, the standard form of luck egalitarianism, may be.
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Citations of this work BETA
Carl Knight (2013). Egalitarian Justice and Expected Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):1061-1073.
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