Disjunctivism Unmotivated

Many naive realists endorse a negative disjunctivist strategy in order to deal with the challenge presented by the possibility of phenomenologically indistinguishable halucination. In the first part of this paper I argue that this approach is methodologically inconsistent because it undercuts the phenomenological motivation that underlies the the appeal of naive realism. In the second part of the paper I develop an alternative to the negative disjunctivist account along broadly Meinongian lines. In the last section of this paper I consider and evaluate a somewhat similar but rival view of hallucination developed by Mark Johnston.
Keywords disjunctivism  naive realism  perception  hallucination  non-existent objects  Meinong  direct realism
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-013-9304-4
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Michael G. F. Martin (2006). On Being Alienated. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press

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