Graduate studies at Western
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18 (2013)
|Abstract||Many naive realists endorse a negative disjunctivist strategy in order to deal with the challenge presented by the possibility of phenomenologically indistinguishable halucination. In the first part of this paper I argue that this approach is methodologically inconsistent because it undercuts the phenomenological motivation that underlies the the appeal of naive realism. In the second part of the paper I develop an alternative to the negative disjunctivist account along broadly Meinongian lines. In the last section of this paper I consider and evaluate a somewhat similar but rival view of hallucination developed by Mark Johnston.|
|Keywords||disjunctivism naive realism perception hallucination non-existent objects Meinong direct realism|
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