David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 9 (4):491-514 (2007)
A long series of studies in social psychology have shown that the explanations people give for their own behaviors are fundamentally different from the explanations they give for the behaviors of others. Still, a great deal of uncertainty remains about precisely what sorts of differences one finds here. We offer a new approach to addressing the problem. Specifically, we distinguish between two levels of representation ─ the level of linguistic structure (which consists of the actual series of words used in the explanation) and the level of conceptual structure (which consists of the concepts these words are used to express). We then formulate and test hypotheses both about self-other differences in conceptual structure and about self-other differences in the mapping from conceptual structure to linguistic structure.
|Keywords||attribution self-perception social perception social cognition|
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Andrew E. Monroe & Bertram F. Malle (2010). From Uncaused Will to Conscious Choice: The Need to Study, Not Speculate About People’s Folk Concept of Free Will. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):211-224.
Cameron Buckner (2013). Morgan's Canon, Meet Hume's Dictum: Avoiding Anthropofabulation in Cross-Species Comparisons. Biology and Philosophy 28 (5):853-871.
Frank C. Keil (2010). The Feasibility of Folk Science. Cognitive Science 34 (5):826-862.
Kristin Andrews (2009). Understanding Norms Without a Theory of Mind. Inquiry 52 (5):433-448.
Kristin Andrews (2015). The Folk Psychological Spiral: Explanation, Regulation, and Language. Southern Journal of Philosophy 53:50-67.
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