David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):119-122 (2007)
In earlier work, I relied on a commonly-held view about the relationship between the concept of acting intentionally and the concept of performing a behavior in order to achieve a goal. Eric Wiland responds that it was actually a mistake to rely on this view and that the relationship between these concepts is far more complex than was previously thought. I now think that Wiland may be right to reject my earlier approach, and I therefore provide additional empirical support for his basic claim. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
|Keywords||intentional action psychological subjects construction Joshua Knobe in order to|
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Thomas Nadelhoffer (2006). On Trying to Save the Simple View. Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.
Thomas Nadelhoffer (2006). On Trying to Save the Simple View. Mind Language 21 (5):565-586.
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