Acting intentionally and acting for a reason

In earlier work, I relied on a commonly-held view about the relationship between the concept of acting intentionally and the concept of performing a behavior in order to achieve a goal. Eric Wiland responds that it was actually a mistake to rely on this view and that the relationship between these concepts is far more complex than was previously thought. I now think that Wiland may be right to reject my earlier approach, and I therefore provide additional empirical support for his basic claim. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Keywords intentional action   psychological subjects   construction   Joshua Knobe   in order to
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DOI 10.1037/h0091286
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Jean Beer Blumenfeld (1980). Acting Intentionally and Acting Voluntarily. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (1/2):228-231.
Christine Korsgaard (2005). Acting for a Reason. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 40.
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