David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Cognition and Culture 6:193-197 (2006)
This is exciting stuﬀ. Philosophers have long explored the structure of human concepts from the inside, by manipulating their skills as users of those concepts. And since Quine most reasonable philosophers have accepted that the structure is a contingent matter – we or not too diﬀerent creatures could have thought diﬀerently – which in principle can be..
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Colin Allen (1999). Animal Concepts Revisited: The Use of Self-Monitoring as an Empirical Approach. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 51 (1):537-544.
Benjamin Trémoulet (2011). The Structure of the Theoretical Power of Judgment. Kant and the Value of Our Empirical Cognitions. Kant-Studien 102 (1):46-68.
Pam Stewart & Maxine Evers (2010). The Requirement That Lawyers Certify Reasonable Prospects of Success: Must 21st Century Lawyers Boldly Go Where No Lawyer has Gone Before? Legal Ethics 13 (1):1-38.
John Jung Park (2013). Prototypes, Exemplars, and Theoretical & Applied Ethics. Neuroethics 6 (2):237-247.
Andrew Sneddon (2009). Normative Ethics and the Prospects of an Empirical Contribution to Assessment of Moral Disagreement and Moral Realism. Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (4):447-455.
Stephen Beckerman (2000). Mating and Marriage, Husbands and Lovers. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (4):590-591.
Pavel Materna (2009). Concepts and Recipes. Acta Analytica 24 (1):69-90.
Nick Zangwill (2010). Science and Ethics: Demarcation, Holism and Logical Consequences. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):126-138.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads81 ( #52,460 of 1,906,986 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #78,912 of 1,906,986 )
How can I increase my downloads?