But are they right? The prospects for empirical conceptology
Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (2006)
| Abstract | This is exciting stuff. Philosophers have long explored the structure of human concepts from the inside, by manipulating their skills as users of those concepts. And since Quine most reasonable philosophers have accepted that the structure is a contingent matter – we or not too different creatures could have thought differently – which in principle can be.. | |||||||||
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