Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language

Analysis 63 (3):190–194 (2003)
There has been a long-standing dispute in the philosophical literature about the conditions under which a behavior counts as 'intentional.' Much of the debate turns on questions about the use of certain words and phrases in ordinary language. The present paper investigates these questions empirically, using experimental techniques to investigate people's use of the relevant words and phrases. g.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00419
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Joshua Knobe & Bertram Malle (1997). The Folk Concept of Intentionality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 33:101-121.
Michael Bratman (1984). Two Faces of Intention. Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Joshua Knobe (2007). Experimental Philosophy. Philosophy Compass 2 (1):81–92.
Joshua Knobe (2010). Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315.

View all 150 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

222 ( #7,296 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

78 ( #17,232 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.