Intentional action in folk psychology: An experimental investigation

Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):309-325 (2003)
Abstract
Four experiments examined people’s folk-psychological concept of intentional action. The chief question was whether or not _evaluative _considerations — considerations of good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame — played any role in that concept. The results indicated that the moral qualities of a behavior strongly influence people’s judgements as to whether or not that behavior should be considered ‘intentional.’ After eliminating a number of alternative explanations, the author concludes that this effect is best explained by the hypothesis that evaluative considerations do play some role in people’s concept of intentional action.<b> </b>.
Keywords Action  Experiment  Folk Psychology  Intentional  Metaphysics  Mind
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S. Matthew Liao (2008). A Defense of Intuitions. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):247 - 262.
Joshua Knobe (2010). Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315.

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