David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315 (2010)
It has often been suggested that people’s ordinary capacities for understanding the world make use of much the same methods one might find in a formal scientific investigation. A series of recent experimental results offer a challenge to this widely-held view, suggesting that people’s moral judgments can actually influence the intuitions they hold both in folk psychology and in causal cognition. The present target article distinguishes two basic approaches to explaining such effects. One approach would be to say that the relevant competencies are entirely non-moral but that some additional factor (conversational pragmatics, performance error, etc.) then interferes and allows people’s moral judgments to affect their intuitions. Another approach would be to say that moral considerations truly do figure in workings of the competencies themselves. It is argued that the data available now favor the second of these approaches over the first
|Keywords||Causal cognition moral cognition theory of mind|
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Citations of this work BETA
Toni Adleberg, Morgan Thompson & Eddy Nahmias (2014). Do Men and Women Have Different Philosophical Intuitions? Further Data. Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):615-641.
David Rose & Jonathan Schaffer (2013). Knowledge Entails Dispositional Belief. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):19-50.
Joshua Knobe & Richard Samuels (2013). Thinking Like a Scientist: Innateness as a Case Study. Cognition 126 (1):72-86.
Wesley Buckwalter, David Rose & John Turri (2015). Belief Through Thick and Thin. Noûs 49 (4):748-775.
Wesley Buckwalter (2012). Non-Traditional Factors in Judgments About Knowledge. Philosophy Compass 7 (4):278-289.
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