Physicalism, teleology and the miraculous coincidence problem

Philosophical Quarterly 50 (195):164-81 (1999)
Abstract
I focus on Fodor’s model of the relationship between special sciences and basic physics, and on a criticism of this model, that it implies that the causal stability of, e.g., the mental in its production of behaviour is nothing short of a miraculous coincidence. David Papineau and Graham Macdonaldendorse this criticism. But it is far less clear than they assume that Fodor’s picture indeed involves coincidences, which in any case their injection of a teleological supplement cannot explain. Papineau’s and Macdonald’s problem is subtly different from a similar one presented by Adrian Cussins. This is no more effective against Fodor’s picture, but the kind of account of the relation between the physical and the psychological which could constitute a solution to Cussins’ problem is one which, for independent reasons, a physicalist of Fodor’s stripe ought to provide
Keywords Logic  Physicalism  Teleology  Fodor, J
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,360
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    David Papineau (1992). Irreducibility and Teleology. In David Charles & Kathleen Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford University Press.
    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    Torin Alter (2002). Nagel on Imagination and Physicalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:143-58.
    William Charlton (1991). Teleology and Mental States. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 17:17-32.
    F. J. K. Soontiëns (1991). Evolution: Teleology or Chance? [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 22 (1):133-141.
    A. D. Smith (1993). Non-Reductive Physicalism? In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
    Alan Zaitchik (1981). Reply to Professor Fodor on Physicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (December):294-295.
    Noa Latham (2003). What is Token Physicalism? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (3):270-290.
    Mohan Matthen (1991). Naturalism and Teleology. Journal of Philosophy 88 (11):656-657.
    David Papineau (1992). Irreducibility and Teleology. In David Charles & Kathleen Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford University Press.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-01-28

    Total downloads

    20 ( #71,710 of 1,089,153 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,735 of 1,089,153 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.