David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cognition 126 (1):72-86 (2013)
The concept of innateness appears in systematic research within cognitive science, but it also appears in less systematic modes of thought that long predate the scientific study of the mind. The present studies therefore explore the relationship between the properly scientific uses of this concept and its role in ordinary folk understanding. Studies 1-4 examined the judgments of people with no specific training in cognitive science. Results showed (a) that judgments about whether a trait was innate were not affected by whether or not the trait was learned, but (b) such judgments were impacted by moral considerations. Study 5 looked at the judgments of both non-scientists and scientists, in conditions that encouraged either thinking about individual cases or thinking about certain general principles. In the case-based condition, both non-scientists and scientists showed an impact of moral considerations but little impact of learning. In the principled condition, both non-scientists and scientists showed an impact of learning but little impact of moral considerations. These results suggest that both non-scientists and scientists are drawn to a conception of innateness that differs from the one at work in contemporary scientific research but that they are also both capable of 'filtering out' their initial intuitions and using a more scientific approach.
|Keywords||Innateness Moral cognition Scientific cognition|
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References found in this work BETA
Joshua Knobe (2003). Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language. Analysis 63 (3):190–194.
Joshua Knobe (2010). Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315.
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Citations of this work BETA
Moti Mizrahi (2015). Three Arguments Against the Expertise Defense. Metaphilosophy 46 (1):52-64.
Jonathan Phillips, Jamie B. Luguri & Joshua Knobe (2015). Unifying Morality’s Influence on Non-Moral Judgments: The Relevance of Alternative Possibilities. Cognition 145:30-42.
Jennifer Nado (2014). Philosophical Expertise. Philosophy Compass 9 (9):631-641.
James R. Beebe & Ryan J. Undercoffer (2015). Moral Valence and Semantic Intuitions. Erkenntnis 80 (2):445-466.
Angelo Turri & John Turri (2015). The Truth About Lying. Cognition 138:161-168.
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