David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42 (2):262-271 (2011)
The recent discussion on scientific representation has focused on models and their relationship to the real world. It has been assumed that models give us knowledge because they represent their supposed real target systems. However, here agreement among philosophers of science has tended to end as they have presented widely different views on how representation should be understood. I will argue that the traditional representational approach is too limiting as regards the epistemic value of modelling given the focus on the relationship between a single model and its supposed target system, and the neglect of the actual representational means with which scientists construct models. I therefore suggest an alternative account of models as epistemic tools. This amounts to regarding them as concrete artefacts that are built by specific representational means and are constrained by their design in such a way that they facilitate the study of certain scientific questions, and learning from them by means of construction and manipulation.
|Keywords||Scientific mod Epistemic tools Representation Modelling|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Anna Alexandrova (2006). Connecting Economic Models to the Real World: Game Theory and the Fcc Spectrum Auctions. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (2):173-192.
Daniela M. Bailer-Jones (2003). When Scientific Models Represent. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (1):59 – 74.
Andreas Bartels (2006). Defending the Structural Concept of Representation. Theoria 21 (55):7-19.
Laurence BonJour, Epistemological Problems of Perception. Stanford Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Citations of this work BETA
Tarja Knuuttila & Mieke Boon (2011). How Do Models Give Us Knowledge? The Case of Carnot's Ideal Heat Engine. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (3):309-334.
Sara Green (2013). When One Model is Not Enough: Combining Epistemic Tools in Systems Biology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 44 (2):170-180.
Axel Gelfert (2013). Synthetic Biology Between Technoscience and Thing Knowledge. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 44 (2):141-149.
Ashley Graham Kennedy (2012). A Non Representationalist View of Model Explanation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43 (2):326-332.
Ekaterina Svetlova (2013). De-Idealization by Commentary: The Case of Financial Valuation Models. Synthese 190 (2):321-337.
Similar books and articles
Gabriele Contessa (2007). Representing Reality: The Ontology of Scientific Models and Their Representational Function. Dissertation, University of London
Adam Toon (2010). Models as Make-Believe. In Roman Frigg & Matthew Hunter (eds.), Beyond Mimesis and Convention: Representation in Art and Science. Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science
Tarja Knuuttila (2005). Models, Representation, and Mediation. Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1260-1271.
Agnes Bolinska (2013). Epistemic Representation, Informativeness and the Aim of Faithful Representation. Synthese 190 (2):219-234.
Adam Toon (2010). The Ontology of Theoretical Modelling: Models as Make-Believe. Synthese 172 (2):301-315.
Bruce Edmonds (2000). Complexity and Scientific Modelling. Foundations of Science 5 (3):379-390.
Mauricio Suárez (2010). Scientific Representation. Philosophy Compass 5 (1):91-101.
Roman Frigg (2006). Scientific Representation and the Semantic View of Theories. Theoria 21 (1):49-65.
Ronald Giere (2010). An Agent-Based Conception of Models and Scientific Representation. Synthese 172 (2):269–281.
Tarja Knuuttila (2009). Isolating Representations Versus Credible Constructions? Economic Modelling in Theory and Practice. Erkenntnis 70 (1):59 - 80.
Marion Vorms (2011). Representing with Imaginary Models: Formats Matter. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42 (2):287-295.
Gabriele Contessa (2007). Scientific Representation, Interpretation, and Surrogative Reasoning. Philosophy of Science 74 (1):48-68.
Added to index2011-06-11
Total downloads145 ( #10,699 of 1,707,766 )
Recent downloads (6 months)15 ( #47,834 of 1,707,766 )
How can I increase my downloads?