Instability and Convergence Under Simple-Majority Rule: Results from Simulation of Committee Choice in Two-Dimensional Space [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Theory and Decision 50 (4):305-332 (2001)
Nondeterministic models of collective choice posit convergence among the outcomes of simple-majority decisions. The object of this research is to estimate the extent of convergence of majority choice under different procedural conditions. The paper reports results from a computer simulation of simple-majority decision making by committees. Simulation experiments generate distributions of majority-adopted proposals in two-dimensional space. These represent nondeterministic outcomes of majority choice by committees. The proposal distributions provide data for a quantitative evaluation of committee-choice procedures in respect to outcome convergence. Experiments were run under general conditions, and under conditions that restrict committee choice to several game-theoretic solution sets. The findings are that, compared to distributions of voter ideal points, majority-adopted proposals confined to the solution sets demonstrate different degrees of convergence. Second, endogenous agenda formation is a more important obstacle to convergence than the inherent instability of simple-majority rule. Third, if members maximize preferences in respect to agenda formation, a committee choice that approximates the central tendency of the distribution of voter preferences is unlikely. The conclusion is that the most effective way to increase the convergence of majority choice is to restrict the role of individual preferences in agenda formation: identification of proposals to be voted up or down by a committee
|Keywords||majority rule spatial voting models computer simulation rational choice committee choice convergence|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Michel Regenwetter, James Adams & Bernard Grofman (2002). On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An Alternative View of Majority Cycles and Social Homogeneity. Theory and Decision 53 (2):153-186.
I. D. A. Macintyre (1998). Two-Person and Majority Continuous Aggregation in 2-Good Space in Social Choice: A Note. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 44 (2):199-209.
Mathias Risse (2009). On the Philosophy of Group Decision Methods I: The Nonobviousness of Majority Rule. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):793-802.
Mark Gradstein (1986). Conditions for the Optimality of Simple Majority Decisions in Pairwise Choice Situations. Theory and Decision 21 (2):181-187.
Luba Sapir (1998). The Optimality of the Expert and Majority Rules Under Exponentially Distributed Competence. Theory and Decision 45 (1):19-36.
Jitendra Nath Sarker (2006). Majority Rule and Minority Rights. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 2:169-173.
Edmund Chattoe-Brown (2009). The Social Transmission of Choice: A Simulation with Applications to Hegemonic Discourse. Mind and Society 8 (2):193-207.
Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan (2011). Condorcet Vs. Borda in Light of a Dual Majoritarian Approach. Theory and Decision 71 (2):151-162.
Gilbert Laffond (2000). Majority Voting on Orders. Theory and Decision 49 (3):249-287.
Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2004). Voting Procedures for Complex Collective Decisions. An Epistemic Perspective. Ratio Juris 17 (2):241-258.
Added to index2010-09-02
Total downloads8 ( #169,856 of 1,100,932 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #58,761 of 1,100,932 )
How can I increase my downloads?