Popper's metaphysical research program for the human sciences

Inquiry 18 (4):437 – 462 (1975)
Abstract
Popper has provided a model for the scientific explanation of human actions and a metaphysical theory of man which can guide scientific research. In this paper I discuss the problems of the empirical content and nomicity of the Rationality Principle and extend the method of situational analysis to the problem of explaining beliefs. The domain of applicability of the Rationality Principle is bounded on one side by cases in which behavior is determined by processes which can not be influenced by criticism and on the other side by the phenomenon of substantive creativity. However, a large part of human activity lies within its scope.
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DOI 10.1080/00201747508601777
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References found in this work BETA
K. R. Popper (1966). Conjectures and Refutations. Les Etudes Philosophiques 21 (3):431-434.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jack Birner (1995). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Journal of Economic Methodology 2 (2):304-311.

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