David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:237 - 244 (1990)
This paper first argues that evolutionary models of conceptual development which are patterned on Darwinian selection are unlikely to solve the demarcation problem. The persistence of myths shows that in most social environments unfalsifiable ideas are more likely to survive than ones which can be subjected to empirical scrutiny. I then analyze Hull's claims about how the credit system operates in science and conclude with him that it can perform a surprising variety of functions. However I argue that the credit system must be constantly tempered by internalized norms which encapsulate the traditional ultimate aims of science.
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