David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Symbolic Logic 64 (4):1491-1511 (1999)
In ,  G. Kreisel introduced the no-counterexample interpretation (n.c.i.) of Peano arithmetic. In particular he proved, using a complicated ε-substitution method (due to W. Ackermann), that for every theorem A (A prenex) of first-order Peano arithmetic PA one can find ordinal recursive functionals Φ A of order type 0 which realize the Herbrand normal form A H of A. Subsequently more perspicuous proofs of this fact via functional interpretation (combined with normalization) and cut-elimination were found. These proofs however do not carry out the no-counterexample interpretation as a local proof interpretation and don't respect the modus ponens on the level of the no-counterexample interpretation of formulas A and A → B. Closely related to this phenomenon is the fact that both proofs do not establish the condition (δ) and--at least not constructively-- (γ) which are part of the definition of an 'interpretation of a formal system' as formulated in . In this paper we determine the complexity of the no-counterexample interpretation of the modus ponens rule for (i) PA-provable sentences, (ii) for arbitrary sentences A, B ∈ L(PA) uniformly in functionals satisfying the no-counterexample interpretation of (prenex normal forms of) A and A → B, and (iii) for arbitrary A, B ∈ L(PA) pointwise in given α( 0 ) -recursive functionals satisfying the no-counterexample interpretation of A and A → B. This yields in particular perspicuous proofs of new uniform versions of the conditions (γ), (δ). Finally we discuss a variant of the concept of an interpretation presented in  and show that it is incomparable with the concept studied in , . In particular we show that the no-counterexample interpretation of PA n by α( n (ω))-recursive functionals (n ≥ 1) is an interpretation in the sense of  but not in the sense of  since it violates the condition (δ)
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