David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Thus, despite the di culty of higher-order automated theorem proving, which has to deal with problems like the undecidability of higher-order uni - cation (HOU) and the need for primitive substitution, there are proof problems which lie beyond the capabilities of rst-order theorem provers, but instead can be solved easily by an higher-order theorem prover (HOATP) like Leo. This is due to the expressiveness of higher-order Logic and, in the special case of Leo, due to an appropriate handling of the extensionality principles (functional extensionality and extensionality on truth values).
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