Phenomenal Contrast: A Critique

In some philosophical arguments an important role is played by the claim that certain situations differ from each other with respect to phenomenology. One class of such arguments are minimal pair arguments. These have been used to argue that there is cognitive phenomenology, that high-level properties are represented in perceptual experience, that understanding has phenomenology, and more. I argue that facts about our mental lives systematically block such arguments, reply to a range of objections, and apply my critique to some examples from the literature.
Keywords phenomenal contrast  minimal pairs  knowledge of consciousness
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PhilPapers Archive Ole Koksvik, Phenomenal Contrast: A Critique
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