Intuition, Belief and Rational Criticisability

A simple reductive view of intuition holds that intuition is a type of belief. That an agent who intuits that p sometimes believes that p is false is often thought to demonstrate that the simple reductive view is false. I show that this argument is inconclusive, but also that an argument for the same conclusion can be rebuilt using the notion of rational criticisability. I then use that notion to argue that perception is also not reducible to belief, and that neither intuition nor perception is reducible to credence.
Keywords intuition  rational criticisability
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PhilPapers Archive Ole Koksvik, Intuition, Belief and Rational Criticisability
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