David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229 - 263 (2007)
Recently, much attention has been paid to ‘rational requirements’ and, especially, to what I call ‘rational requirements of formal coherence as such’. These requirements are satisfied just when our attitudes are formally coherent: for example, when our beliefs do not contradict each other. Nevertheless, these requirements are puzzling. In particular, it is unclear why we should satisfy them. In light of this, I explore the conjecture that there are no requirements of formal coherence. I do so by trying to construct a theory of error for the idea that there are such requirements.
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Citations of this work BETA
Kenny Easwaran (2015). Dr. Truthlove Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities. Noûs 49 (3).
Stephen Finlay (2010). What Ought Probably Means, and Why You Can't Detach It. Synthese 177 (1):67 - 89.
Kenny Easwaran & Branden Fitelson (2012). An 'Evidentialist' Worry About Joyce's Argument for Probabilism. Dialetica 66 (3):425-433.
Errol Lord (2014). The Coherent and the Rational. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):151-175.
Jonathan Way (2010). Defending the Wide-Scope Approach to Instrumental Reason. Philosophical Studies 147 (2):213 - 233.
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