Ifs and Oughts

Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):115-143 (2010)
Abstract
We consider a paradox involving indicative conditionals (‘ifs’) and deontic modals (‘oughts’). After considering and rejecting several standard options for resolv- ing the paradox—including rejecting various premises, positing an ambiguity or hidden contextual sensitivity, and positing a non-obvious logical form—we offer a semantics for deontic modals and indicative conditionals that resolves the paradox by making modus ponens invalid. We argue that this is a result to be welcomed on independent grounds, and we show that rejecting the general validity of modus ponens is compatible with vindicating most ordinary uses of modus ponens in reasoning.
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Citations of this work BETA
Kieran Setiya (2014). What is a Reason to Act? Philosophical Studies 167 (2):221-235.
Seth Yalcin (2010). Probability Operators. Philosophy Compass 5 (11):916-37.
Matthew Chrisman (2012). 'Ought' and Control. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):433-451.

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