Why Be Disposed to Be Coherent?

Ethics 118 (3):437-463 (2008)
Abstract
My subject is what I will call the “Myth of Formal Coherence.” In its normative telling, the Myth is that there are “requirements of formal coherence as such,” which demand just that our beliefs and intentions be formally coherent.1 Some examples are.
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    Michael E. Bratman (2011). Intention Rationality. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):227-241.
    Sam Shpall (2013). Wide and Narrow Scope. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):717-736.
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