David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind 114 (455):509-563 (2005)
Normativity involves two kinds of relation. On the one hand, there is the relation of being a reason for. This is a relation between a fact and an attitude. On the other hand, there are relations specified by requirements of rationality. These are relations among a person's attitudes, viewed in abstraction from the reasons for them. I ask how the normativity of rationality—the sense in which we ‘ought’ to comply with requirements of rationality—is related to the normativity of reasons—the sense in which we ‘ought’ to have the attitudes what we have conclusive reason to have. The normativity of rationality is not straightforwardly that of reasons, I argue; there are no reasons to comply with rational requirements in general. First, this would lead to ‘bootstrapping’, because, contrary to the claims of John Broome, not all rational requirements have ‘wide scope’. Second, it is unclear what such reasons to be rational might be. Finally, we typically do not, and in many cases could not, treat rational requirements as reasons. Instead, I suggest, rationality is only apparently normative, and the normativity that it appears to have is that of reasons. According to this ‘Transparency Account’, rational requirements govern our responses to our beliefs about reasons. The normative ‘pressure’ that we feel, when rational requirements apply to us, derives from these beliefs: from the reasons that, as it seems to us, we have.
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Kurt Sylvan (2015). What Apparent Reasons Appear to Be. Philosophical Studies 172 (3):587-606.
Benjamin Kiesewetter (forthcoming). You Ought to Φ Only If You May Believe That You Ought to Φ. Philosophical Quarterly.
Ruth Chang (2013). Grounding Practical Normativity: Going Hybrid. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):163-187.
Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (forthcoming). If You Justifiably Believe That You Ought to Φ, You Ought to Φ. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
Susanna Rinard (2015). Against the New Evidentialists. Philosophical Issues 25 (1):208-223.
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