Graduate studies at Western
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):76-77 (1998)
|Abstract||There are three points of difference between psychologists' assumptions and those that Millikan suggests: (1) concepts as representations versus concepts as reflecting a capacity; (2) concepts having a role in categorization and inference versus a role in reidentification; and (3) the “basic level” as an aspect of the “vertical” dimension of categories versus being a kind of category, on a par with natural kinds.|
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