David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):457 - 467 (2004)
Do we need defeasible generalizations in epistemology, generalizations that are genuinely explanatory yet ineliminably exception-laden? Do we need them to endow our epistemology with a substantial explanatory structure? Mark Lance and Margaret Little argue for the claim that we do. I will argue that we can just as well do without them – at least in epistemology. So in the paper, I am trying to very briefly sketch an alternative contextualist picture. More specifically, the claim will be that although an epistemic contextualist should commit himself to epistemic holism he can nevertheless appeal to epistemic principles other than defeasible generalizations in order to provide his epistemology with a structure.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Ethics Logic Ontology|
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References found in this work BETA
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1969). On Certainty (Ed. Anscombe and von Wright). Harper Torchbooks.
Jonathan Dancy (1993). Moral Reasons. Blackwell.
Michael Williams (2001). Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology. OUP Oxford.
Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.) (2000). Moral Particularism. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Jennifer Flynn (2010). Recent Work: Moral Particularism. Analysis 70 (1):140-148.
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