David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):246–272 (2000)
Much moral skepticism stems from the charge that moral facts do not figure in causal explanations. However, philosophers committed to normative epistemological discourse (by which I mean our practice of evaluating beliefs as justified or unjustified, and so forth) are in no position to demand that normative facts serve such a role, since epistemic facts are causally impotent as well. I argue instead that pragmatic reasons can justify our continued participation in practices which, like morality and epistemology, do not serve the function of causal explanation. Finally, I defend this pragmatic justification of morality and epistemology against a number of objections, including the objection that it confuses practical and theoretical justification.
|Keywords||morality epistemology explanation fact knowledge normativity|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Eric Vogelstein (2011). Morality, Reasons, and Sentiments. Philosophical Studies 155 (3):421-432.
B. C. Postow (1988). Bookreviews. Annals of Science 45 (6):647-670.
Peter Schulte (2012). The Difference Between Moral and Rational “Oughts”: An Expressivist Account. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):159-174.
Nick Zangwill (2006). Moral Epistemology and the Because Constraint. In James Lawrence Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Blackwell Pub. 263--281.
M. Janvid (2004). Epistemological Naturalism and the Normativity Objection. Erkenntnis 60 (1):35-49.
Mikael Janvid (2004). Epistemological Naturalism and the Normativity Objection or From Normativity to Constitutivity. Erkenntnis 60 (1):35 - 49.
Mikael Janvid (2004). Epistemological Naturalism and the Normativity Objection or From Normativity to Constitutivity. Erkenntnis 60 (1):35-49.
Jeremy Randel Koons (2006). An Argument Against Reduction in Morality and Epistemology. Philosophical Investigations 29 (3):250–274.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads32 ( #85,358 of 1,700,283 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #77,273 of 1,700,283 )
How can I increase my downloads?