Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (1):1-21 (2008)
|Abstract||Two groups of agents, G1 and G2, face a *moral conflict* if G1 has a moral obligation and G2 has a moral obligation, such that these obligations cannot both be fulfilled. We study moral conflicts using a multi-agent deontic logic devised to represent reasoning about sentences like "In the interest of group F of agents, group G of agents ought to see to it that phi". We provide a formal language and a consequentialist semantics. An illustration of our semantics with an analysis of the Prisoner’s Dilemma follows. Next, necessary and sufficient conditions are given for (1) the possibility that a single group of agents faces a moral conflict, for (2) the possibility that two groups of agents face a moral conflict within a single moral code, and for (3) the possibility that two groups of agents face a moral conflict.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jim Vernon (2008). The Moral Necessity of Moral Conflict in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Epoché 13 (1):67-80.
İlker Yıldırım & Pınar Yolum (2009). Hybrid Models for Achieving and Maintaining Cooperative Symbiotic Groups. Mind and Society 8 (2):243-258.
Adina Preda (2012). Group Rights and Group Agency. Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):229-254.
Luke Robinson (2013). A Dispositional Account of Conflicts of Obligation. Noûs 47 (2):203-228.
Donald Beggs (2009). Postliberal Theory. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (3):219 - 234.
Michael J. Almeida (1990). Deontic Logic and the Possibility of Moral Conflict. Erkenntnis 33 (1):57 - 71.
Michael J. Almeida (2008). On Vague Eschatology. Faith and Philosophy 25 (4):359-375.
Michael D. Smith (1982). The Virtuous Organization. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 7 (1):35-42.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads21 ( #58,633 of 548,973 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,438 of 548,973 )
How can I increase my downloads?