The incompatibility of naturalism and scientific realism
| Abstract | Whenever philosophers bother to offer a defense for philosophical naturalism, they typically appeal to the authority of natural science. Science is supposed to provide us with a picture of the world so much more reliable and well-supported than that provided by any non-scientific source of information that we are entitled, perhaps even obliged, to withhold belief in anything that is not an intrinsic part of our our best scientific picture of the world. This scientism is taken to support philosophical naturalism, since, at present, our best scientific picture of 1 Incompatibility of Naturalism and Scientific Realism.. | |||||||||
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Michael C. Rea (2002). World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism. Oxford University Press.
Stathis Psillos (2001). Studies in Scientific Realism. Foundations of Chemistry 3 (1):79-86.
Juha Saatsi (2012). Scientific Realism and Historical Evidence: Shortcomings of the Current State of Debate. In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer.
Huw Price (2007). Quining Naturalism. Journal of Philosophy 104 (8):375-402.
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