David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):401--413 (2004)
John Greco has proposed a new sort of contextualism which exhibits a principled grounding in an agent reliabilist virtue epistemology. In this paper I will discuss Grecos two main reasons in favor of virtue contextualism. The first reason is that his account of knowledge can be derived from a more general theory of virtue and credit. The second reason consists in the thesis that a virtue contextualist solution to the lottery problem is superior to standards contextualism. With regard to the first claim, I raise some questions concerning the status and the content of the crucial conditions for Grecos theory of intellectual credit. With regard to the second claim, I try to show that his arguments do not succeed in establishing the superiority of virtue contextualism to standards contextualism. I close with some remarks on the relation among Grecos virtue contextualism, the traditional approach to the theory of knowledge and the proper domain of contextualism.
|Keywords||contextualism, epistemology, greco john, lottery, Reliabilism, virtue|
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References found in this work BETA
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2003). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge University Press.
John Greco (2003). ``Knowledge as Credit for True Belief". In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press 111-134.
Stewart Cohen (1988). How to Be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.
Joel Feinberg (1970). Doing & Deserving; Essays in the Theory of Responsibility. Princeton, N.J.,Princeton University Press.
John Greco (2003). Further Thoughts on Agent Reliabilism: Replies to Cohen, Geivett, Kvanvig, and Schmitt and Lahroodi. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):466–480.
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