On the prospects for virtue contextualism: Comments on Greco

Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):401--413 (2004)
John Greco has proposed a new sort of contextualism which exhibits a principled grounding in an agent reliabilist virtue epistemology. In this paper I will discuss Grecos two main reasons in favor of virtue contextualism. The first reason is that his account of knowledge can be derived from a more general theory of virtue and credit. The second reason consists in the thesis that a virtue contextualist solution to the lottery problem is superior to standards contextualism. With regard to the first claim, I raise some questions concerning the status and the content of the crucial conditions for Grecos theory of intellectual credit. With regard to the second claim, I try to show that his arguments do not succeed in establishing the superiority of virtue contextualism to standards contextualism. I close with some remarks on the relation among Grecos virtue contextualism, the traditional approach to the theory of knowledge and the proper domain of contextualism.
Keywords contextualism, epistemology, greco john, lottery, Reliabilism, virtue
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DOI 10.2307/20013299
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References found in this work BETA
John Greco (2003). ``Knowledge as Credit for True Belief". In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press 111-134.
Stewart Cohen (1988). How to Be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.

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